Britain talks about grooming as if the word has one obvious meaning: a vulnerable girl, a predatory man, a system that should have protected her but did not.

For years, much of the media and political class has returned to that story—often through the image of white girls exploited by Asian or Pakistani-heritage men. The story contains real crimes and real institutional failures. But the way it has been told has also helped turn “grooming gangs” into a racialised political shorthand, repeated across headlines, columns and broadcasts until it can seem like the whole story of child sexual exploitation.

That amplification matters in a country where a small number of powerful companies dominate the national newspaper market. News UK, which publishes The Sun and The Times, is part of Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp; DMG Media, publisher of the Daily Mail, Mail on Sunday, Metro and the i, is controlled by the Rothermere family. Together with Reach, the three groups account for about 90% of national newspaper circulation, according to the Media Reform Coalition’s 2025 ownership report. That does not mean every journalist or outlet says the same thing. It does mean a narrow set of powerful institutions can give particular stories and frames enormous reach.

And the story lands in a country that feels increasingly poorer and less in control: one where public services are strained, productive capacity has weakened, and governments have spent decades selling off assets or asking people to accept less. The causes are complicated. The political story offered to the public often is not: somebody took something from us; somebody else is to blame; take control back and Britain can be restored.

That was the promise behind Brexit’s “Take Back Control” message. The EU and migration were made to carry anxieties about sovereignty, public services and national decline. The slogan made a complicated situation feel simple: Britain had been wronged, and leaving would put things right.

The girl who did not fit the story

But what happens when the person at the centre of the story does not fit the image of the victim Britain has learned to recognise?

Shamima Begum was 15 when she left Britain for Syria with two schoolfriends in 2015. She travelled into territory controlled by Islamic State, married an ISIL fighter and became part of a story that was quickly told in the starkest possible terms: she had chosen the terrorists, so she should never be allowed home.

There is no need to pretend that joining ISIL was harmless, or that national-security concerns were imaginary. The question is whether those concerns were allowed to crowd out another fact: Begum was a child when she left, and the Special Immigration Appeals Commission later found a credible suspicion that she had been trafficked for sexual exploitation.

That finding came from the Special Immigration Appeals Commission in 2023. The commission also said there were arguable failures by state bodies in the period before Begum travelled. Yet it dismissed her appeal against the decision to strip her citizenship. In 2024, the Court of Appeal dismissed her further appeal. The legal outcome was not that she had been cleared, or that trafficking automatically entitled her to return. It was that the Home Secretary could still deprive her of citizenship on national-security grounds, despite the credible suspicion of trafficking.

That distinction matters. “Groomed” is not a magic word that erases agency or resolves every question about risk. But neither should “she chose to go” erase the fact that she was 15, or make the possibility of exploitation irrelevant.

A minister, a power and a political moment

The decision was made by Sajid Javid, then Home Secretary. Section 40 of the British Nationality Act gives the Home Secretary the power to deprive someone of citizenship if it is considered conducive to the public good, provided the decision does not make them stateless. Javid personally made the order on 19 February 2019. The Home Office had prepared a submission; he agreed with its recommendation. This was a legal power exercised by the minister responsible for the department, not a special power attached to his background.

But the politics around the decision deserve scrutiny. Days before he made it, Javid had publicly warned that he would use his powers against people who had joined terrorist organisations abroad. The government’s message was already being delivered to the public before the legal process had run its course. We cannot claim, without evidence, that Javid acted to win votes. We can ask how much the politics of appearing tough shaped the decision, and why the possibility that Begum had been trafficked did not carry more weight in that public argument.

The citizenship decision also relied on a particular legal reality: the government considered Begum a British-Bangladeshi national at the time, so it concluded that removing her British citizenship would not make her stateless. The Court of Appeal later said she had lost Bangladeshi citizenship when she turned 21, and that there was no prospect of Bangladesh admitting her. The 2019 decision was assessed according to her status at the time, but its consequences now reach beyond Britain’s borders. Britain made its decision; Begum remains in Syria, outside the protection of British citizenship.

When the answer is somewhere else

This is part of a wider habit in British politics: when the country faces a difficult problem, the answer is often to move the problem somewhere else, or to find someone else to blame for it.

The Rwanda asylum plan was the clearest recent example. The government proposed sending some people who arrived in Britain to Rwanda, where their asylum claims would be processed. The UN refugee agency said the arrangement would shift responsibility for deciding claims and protecting refugees. The Supreme Court later found substantial grounds to believe that people sent there could face a risk of being returned to countries where they might be persecuted. The scheme was abandoned in 2024. No asylum seekers were sent to Rwanda; the Home Office says four volunteers were sent. It reported £715 million in spending associated with both the Migration and Economic Development Partnership and the Illegal Migration Act, up to June 2024.

Britain has not abolished every route to protection. It still has resettlement and family routes. But there is no visa that lets someone travel to the UK simply to claim asylum from abroad. The routes that do exist are limited and depend on eligibility, while people who cannot use them may still have to reach Britain before they can claim asylum. The point is not that the UK has no obligations. It is that our politics repeatedly promises control by narrowing access, transferring responsibility or insisting that the problem belongs somewhere else.

Take back control, find someone to blame

That is the same emotional grammar that powered Brexit. “Take back control” was not only a promise about laws and borders. It gave people a simple explanation for complicated failures: someone had taken something from us, and if we took it back, things could be put right. The EU became a convenient target for anger about immigration, public services and the loss of control. The slogan offered a story of national recovery without requiring an equally honest account of what Britain had built, sold, weakened or failed to invest in.

And that story matters in a country that has become poorer, less productive and more dependent than it likes to admit; a country that has sold off public assets and still speaks as though it can command events simply because it once did. The language of sovereignty can sound strongest precisely when the country’s practical power is weakest. We tell ourselves that Britain is exceptional, that we can stand alone, that we can impose our will—then discover that we need other countries to take the people we do not want, carry the consequences we do not want to manage, or absorb the risks our policies have created.

This is not an argument that Britain should abandon border control, or that every person who travelled to join ISIL should be treated the same way. Begum’s case involved a child, a national-security assessment, a citizenship power and a credible suspicion of trafficking. The Rwanda plan involved transferring asylum claims to another country. They are not identical cases. What connects them is the political instinct to make a problem appear manageable by moving it beyond the frame of the British public: out of sight, outside the country, attached to another government.

Who gets recognised as a victim?

And there is an uncomfortable contrast in the word “grooming” itself. In Britain, it is often used in public debate to describe groups of men exploiting vulnerable girls. In Rochdale, a 15-year-old girl told police she was being abused; her case was not pursued, and the abuse continued. A parliamentary inquiry later recorded that victims in such cases were not always taken seriously and that prosecutors sometimes doubted their credibility. The girls were failed even when the danger was in front of the authorities.

We should not flatten these cases into one story. But we should ask why some victims become the clearest possible evidence of national failure, while others become symbols of a threat from which the nation must be defended. Begum was a British schoolgirl who may have been groomed and trafficked; she was also assessed as a national-security risk. Both realities belong in the account. The public debate often found room for only one.

Perhaps that is the question Britain keeps avoiding. Not whether Shamima Begum was innocent, or whether the state had the right to act. But whether we can recognise exploitation when the person who may have been exploited is someone we have already decided to hate—and whether a country that is losing confidence in its own power can stop reaching for distant targets to blame.