BRITAIN’S DISAPPEARING RAILWAY
HS2: More Money, Less Railway
Britain promised a national high-speed network. After sixteen years of cuts, cancellations and spiralling costs, what are we actually going to get?
I drive around Britain for work. Every so often, particularly through Buckinghamshire and the Midlands, I see another piece of HS2.
A viaduct appears beside the road. A bridge crosses an apparently empty landscape. There are compounds, cranes, temporary roads, tunnel entrances and enormous sections of earth being moved from one place to another. You cannot miss the scale of it.
There is clearly something being built.
But after years of announcements, delays, cancellations, redesigns and political speeches, I have a much more basic question:
What are we actually going to get?
Not what HS2 was supposed to become. Not what ministers promised in 2010, 2012 or 2017. Not the economic benefits recycled from business cases written for a railway that has since been deleted.
What physical railway will Britain possess when the construction finally ends—and what will we have paid for it?
That question has become increasingly difficult to answer because the political conversation around HS2 rarely begins at the beginning.
Every announcement is treated as a separate development. Another delay. Another station redesign. Another programme reset. Another proposal to attract private investment. Another replacement railway for a section that should never have been cancelled.
Taken individually, each decision can be explained away.
Taken together, they reveal something much worse.
THE PROMISE
The Railway Britain Was Promised
HS2 was not sold as a fast shuttle between London and Birmingham.
It was presented as a new national railway: a high-speed spine running north from London before dividing into two arms. The western leg would connect Birmingham, Crewe and Manchester. The eastern leg would reach the East Midlands, Sheffield and Leeds.
HS2-compatible trains would then continue beyond the dedicated high-speed tracks onto the conventional railway, spreading the advertised benefits to places including Liverpool, Stoke-on-Trent, Stafford, Preston, York, Newcastle, Glasgow and Edinburgh.
Those categories were frequently compressed into one convenient phrase: “connected to HS2.”
But a city receiving a compatible train over the existing railway is not the same thing as a city receiving a new high-speed line. That distinction becomes decisive once the new northern infrastructure is removed.
The railway was also supposed to achieve more than shorter journey times. Its most important purpose was capacity.
Long-distance services would transfer from the West Coast Main Line and other existing routes onto HS2. That would release paths for additional commuter, regional and freight services. Cities would become better connected. Businesses would gain access to larger labour markets. The economic dominance of London might finally be challenged by better connections across the Midlands and the North.
The government described HS2 as a transformational national project.
Phase One was expected to open in 2026. The extension to Crewe was promoted for 2027. The complete network was expected to connect London, Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds.
It was an enormous promise—but at least it was a coherent one.
That railway no longer exists.
THE DELETION
Watch the Railway Disappear
HS2 did not suffer one isolated cancellation. The railway was progressively stripped back while the most expensive southern construction became increasingly difficult to reverse.
The changing map exposes what political language such as “rescoping,” “reprioritisation” and “alternative delivery” conceals.
The original promise
A Y-shaped high-speed railway linking London and Birmingham with dedicated northern legs to Manchester and Leeds.
The 2021 railway
The Integrated Rail Plan removes most of the eastern leg. Leeds loses its HS2 line and the East Midlands and Sheffield plans are rewritten.
The surviving railway
Phase 2a to Crewe and the western leg to Manchester are cancelled. Dedicated HS2 infrastructure ends at Handsacre, where trains return to the existing West Coast Main Line.
In 2021, the Integrated Rail Plan removed most of the eastern leg. The dedicated high-speed route to Leeds disappeared. The proposed East Midlands and Sheffield arrangements were rewritten yet again.
In October 2023, Rishi Sunak cancelled Phase 2a from the West Midlands to Crewe and the remaining Phase 2b route to Manchester.
The announcement was made in Manchester.
What survives is principally a new high-speed railway between London and the West Midlands, with a connection at Handsacre allowing compatible trains to join the existing West Coast Main Line.
The original Y has become a stem.
The North was largely removed from a railway repeatedly justified in the name of rebalancing the country towards the North.
THE TIMELINE
Sixteen Years of Managed Collapse
HS2 did not fail in one dramatic moment. It deteriorated through a sequence of political decisions, optimistic estimates, redesigns and delayed admissions.
Each government inherited a project already in difficulty. Each promised that stronger management, tighter controls or a revised programme would finally bring it under control.
Meanwhile, expenditure increased and the railway became progressively harder to stop—even as the network used to justify it disappeared.
2009–2010
HS2 is created
HS2 Ltd was established in January 2009 to advise the government on a new high-speed railway from London to the West Midlands and potentially beyond.
By 2010, the proposal had developed into a phased national project. Phase One would connect London and Birmingham. A later Y-shaped extension would divide north of Birmingham, with one arm travelling towards Manchester and another towards Leeds.
Phase One was expected to open in December 2026. The complete network was eventually expected during the early 2030s.
Early estimates placed the full proposed scheme at approximately £30.9–£36 billion, depending on the scope and risk allowance being used. Those figures were expressed in historic prices and cannot be directly compared with today’s cash estimate.
Source: House of Commons Library — High Speed 2 overviewJanuary 2012
The government approves the railway
The coalition government approved the first phase between London and Birmingham and confirmed its intention to proceed with the wider network towards Manchester and Leeds.
HS2 was presented as an answer to future railway-capacity constraints, not simply as a faster train to Birmingham.
Long-distance services would move onto the new line, releasing capacity for regional, commuter and freight services on existing tracks.
This is fundamental to judging the project. HS2 was approved on the basis of a network and the wider capacity benefits that network was expected to produce.
The benefit case was not built solely around the section that survives today.
2013
The price begins moving
The government established a funding envelope of approximately £42.6 billion for infrastructure, with another £7.5 billion allocated for rolling stock.
Crucially, these were expressed in 2011 prices.
The political promise remained intact even as the estimated cost moved upwards. Manchester and Leeds still appeared on the map. Phase One was still expected in 2026.
2015–2017
Cities are encouraged to plan around HS2
The government separated the West Midlands–Crewe section from the rest of Phase Two so that it could be accelerated.
Phase 2a was promoted for opening in 2027, allowing Crewe and destinations farther north to receive HS2 services sooner.
Councils, businesses, developers and landowners began organising real plans around the expected railway.
Crewe prepared for its role as a major northern hub. Manchester planned around new infrastructure at Piccadilly and Manchester Airport. Leeds developed proposals for an integrated HS2 station and surrounding regeneration.
In South Yorkshire, the proposed station moved from Meadowhall to a plan involving services through Sheffield Midland. The East Midlands was promised a new hub at Toton between Nottingham and Derby.
These were not speculative lines kept inside a government presentation. Communities lived with safeguarding and blight. Land was purchased. Development plans changed. Public bodies committed time and money.
Places were told to prepare for a railway that Westminster had not learned how to deliver.
February 2017
Parliament authorises Phase One
The High Speed Rail (London–West Midlands) Act received Royal Assent, providing the legal powers required to construct Phase One.
Land acquisition, demolition, utility diversion, environmental work and construction preparation intensified.
Parliament had authorised the most expensive southern section while the full northern network remained dependent upon later decisions and separate legislation.
Source: High Speed Rail (London–West Midlands) Act 20172019–2020
The crisis can no longer be hidden
Costs and schedules continued deteriorating. The government commissioned the Oakervee Review to assess whether HS2 should continue.
The review recommended proceeding, but Lord Berkeley—its deputy chair—issued a dissenting report. He argued that the official assessment remained too optimistic about costs and benefits.
Independent railway-costing specialist Michael Byng had also produced estimates substantially above the official figures. His work was disputed, but it raised questions about whether the government had properly measured the quantity and cost of the work required.
KPMG analysis and evidence considered through the review process also demonstrated that credible professional assessments existed outside the government’s preferred cost presentation.
The important point is not that every alternative estimate was unquestionably correct. It is that substantial warnings were available before the government committed itself to major construction.
In February 2020, Boris Johnson confirmed that HS2 would proceed.
Ministers presented the decision as the beginning of stronger discipline and better management.
Source: Oakervee Review of HS2April 2020
Notice to Proceed
The government issued formal Notice to Proceed to the main works contractors responsible for Phase One.
This authorised full-scale construction and released major contractual commitments.
HS2 passed from a project that could be cancelled into one whose cancellation would itself become extraordinarily expensive.
The machinery, compounds, excavations, viaducts and tunnel-boring machines followed.
But while the physical railway became harder to stop, the political commitment to its northern network remained easier to withdraw.
November 2021
Leeds and most of the eastern leg are removed
The Integrated Rail Plan radically reduced the eastern side of HS2.
The dedicated high-speed route from the West Midlands to Leeds disappeared. The Toton hub was removed from its original HS2 role. Sheffield’s position changed again. Promised new infrastructure was replaced with a mixture of shorter sections, upgrades and future studies.
The government argued that its revised package could deliver benefits sooner and more efficiently.
But the network used to calculate HS2’s original national benefits had materially changed.
A project justified as a Y-shaped national railway no longer contained one side of the Y.
Source: Integrated Rail Plan for the North and MidlandsMarch 2022
HS2 “remains within budget”
The government’s six-monthly report to Parliament stated that Phase One remained within its overall budget of £44.6 billion.
GOVERNMENT REPORT TO PARLIAMENT
“HS2 remains within budget.”
March 2022
The £44.6 billion consisted of a £40.3 billion target cost and £4.3 billion of government-retained contingency, expressed in the reporting basis used at the time.
Four years later, the comparable 2019-price range would be almost twice as high.
Source: HS2 report to Parliament, March 2022October 2023
Crewe and Manchester are cancelled
At the Conservative Party Conference, Rishi Sunak cancelled Phase 2a between the West Midlands and Crewe and the remaining western leg towards Manchester.
The announcement was made in Manchester.
Years of route development, legislation, land purchases and local planning were discarded.
HS2 would no longer reach Crewe or Manchester on dedicated high-speed track. Manchester Airport lost its proposed station. Manchester Piccadilly lost its HS2 infrastructure.
Euston was separated from the existing delivery arrangements and attached to a proposed development model involving private investment and land-value capture.
The government announced “Network North” and claimed that £36 billion saved through cancellation would be redirected towards other transport projects.
Source: Network North, October 20232024
The surviving railway is still not settled
Parliamentary and National Audit Office scrutiny exposed major uncertainty about how the reduced railway would operate.
Questions remained about service frequency, rolling stock, capacity north of Handsacre, the effect on the West Coast Main Line and the ability of Old Oak Common to operate as the initial London terminus.
Cancelling Phase Two also meant reconsidering the train fleet. Trains continuing north would need to fit the conventional railway and its shorter platforms, potentially reducing the capacity that the original full-length HS2 trains were supposed to provide.
The government had removed the northern infrastructure without having a final operational plan for the railway left behind.
Source: National Audit Office — HS2 after Phase Two2025
Another reset begins
Mark Wild became chief executive of HS2 Ltd with instructions to reset the remaining programme.
The government acknowledged that construction had begun with immature designs, that delivery had not been properly controlled and that contractual and supply-chain arrangements had performed poorly.
Repeated alterations to scope, policy, funding and delivery had added further cost.
By the end of April 2025, approximately £40.5 billion in nominal prices had been spent on the HS2 programme.
No passenger had travelled on it.
In July, safeguarding was removed from most of the cancelled eastern leg. The government announced that more than 550 properties no longer required would be prepared for disposal.
Qualifying former owners would be offered an opportunity to reacquire their former property—but at its current market value.
Source: HS2 report to Parliament, July 2025May 2026
Up to £112.4 billion in possible cash expenditure
Following the reset, the government published a new estimated cost of £87.7–£102.7 billion.
That is not a simple final cash figure. It is a mixed-price presentation centred on Q3 2025: money already spent is combined with estimated future costs before future inflation.
On the government’s comparable 2019 basis, the new range is £70.9–£82.2 billion.
The previous comparable range was £35–£45 billion.
The government also published a provisional inflation-inclusive cash estimate of £94.3–£112.4 billion.
In other words, even £102.7 billion may not represent the number of pounds that will eventually leave the Treasury.
The government attributed approximately two-thirds of the increase to misunderstood or omitted work, underestimation and inefficient delivery—matters within the control of HS2 Ltd, suppliers and previous governments.
Approximately one-third was attributed to inflation.
By the end of March 2026, spending had reached £44.2 billion on the surviving programme. Another £2.6 billion had been recorded against former Phase Two, producing an overall total of approximately £46.8 billion.
The initial operating section from Old Oak Common to Birmingham Curzon Street is now expected to open sometime between May 2036 and October 2039.
The full scheme from Euston to Birmingham, including the Handsacre connection to the West Coast Main Line, is expected between May 2040 and December 2043.
Mark Wild has set an internal ambition of approximately £93.2 billion and a late-2037 initial opening. That is a delivery ambition inside the official range—not a guaranteed outcome.
The railway’s maximum operating speed has also been reduced to 320 kilometres per hour. Government says this could save approximately £1–£2.5 billion and add around three minutes to the London–Birmingham journey.
Phase One was originally supposed to open in 2026.
Source: HS2 report to Parliament, May 2026In the year passengers were supposed to begin using HS2, Britain was still establishing what it would cost, when it would open and how fast its trains would travel.
THE PROJECT IN ONE COMPARISON
The railway became smaller much faster than the bill did.
THE MONEY
How Much Does HS2 Actually Cost?
Answering that question should be simple.
It is not.
HS2 has been presented through a succession of different accounting frames. Some figures are expressed in 2011 prices. Others use 2015, 2019 or 2025 prices. Some include rolling stock. Some exclude it. Some include Euston. Some isolate Phase One. Others refer to the former national network.
Sometimes the figure represents an approved funding envelope. Sometimes it is a target cost. Sometimes it is an estimated range. Sometimes it combines money already spent with future costs that exclude the inflation Britain will experience before those bills are paid.
The figures are not invented. But they are routinely presented in ways that prevent the public from comparing like with like.
Historic purchasing power
An estimate restated as though every pound were spent at 2011 prices. Useful for comparison, but not the amount of cash that eventually leaves the Treasury.
The comparable range
The most useful basis for comparing the former £35–£45 billion range with the revised £70.9–£82.2 billion estimate.
The headline estimate
The £87.7–£102.7 billion range combines actual expenditure with future estimated costs before future inflation.
The pounds potentially paid
The government’s provisional inflation-inclusive estimate is £94.3–£112.4 billion.
| Figure | Amount | What it means |
|---|---|---|
| 2013 infrastructure envelope | £42.6bn | Full proposed network infrastructure, expressed in 2011 prices. |
| 2013 rolling-stock allowance | £7.5bn | Additional train allowance, also expressed in 2011 prices. |
| Previous Phase One range | £35–£45bn | Previous range expressed on the 2019 basis used for comparison. |
| Revised comparable range | £70.9–£82.2bn | Revised cost of the surviving programme on an equivalent 2019 mixed-price basis. |
| 2026 headline range | £87.7–£102.7bn | Money already spent plus future costs presented at Q3 2025 prices, excluding future inflation. |
| Provisional cash estimate | £94.3–£112.4bn | Indicative nominal expenditure after forecast inflation is included. |
The lazy comparison is that a £32 billion railway simply became a £112 billion railway. That is not technically clean because the figures use different scopes and price bases.
But proper comparison does not rescue the project.
On the government’s own equivalent 2019 basis, the former £35–£45 billion range became £70.9–£82.2 billion.
That is roughly twice the previous comparable range after the dedicated lines to Crewe, Manchester and Leeds were removed.
There is another important accounting distinction.
By March 2026, £44.2 billion had been recorded against the surviving HS2 programme. A further £2.6 billion had been spent on the former Phase Two sections, creating an overall spend-to-date figure of approximately £46.8 billion.
The cost of Phase Two did not disappear when the railway disappeared.
Money had already been spent on design, professional services, legislation, land, property and preparation. Cancellation created additional costs, administrative work and years of uncertainty for people living along the route.
The country is now preparing to sell some of that land while retaining other sections because a future railway towards Manchester may still require them.
Source: Department for Transport — HS2 report, May 2026The bill expanded as the railway contracted
These figures are not one continuous historical series. The visual distinguishes the comparable 2019 ranges from the provisional inflation-inclusive cash estimate.
THE STATIONS
Every Place Promised a Railway
The collapse of HS2 becomes easier to understand when it is measured through individual places rather than abstract phases.
Some stations survive. Some were redesigned. Some cities were never going to receive new high-speed infrastructure but were advertised as beneficiaries because compatible trains would reach them over existing tracks.
Others prepared for stations that have now been deleted entirely.
| Station or place | Original position | What changed | Present outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| London Euston | Principal central-London HS2 terminus. | Design reduced, delivery separated and funding arrangements reconsidered. | Six-platform HS2 station planned, opening after the initial railway. DELAYED |
| Old Oak Common | Major interchange with the Elizabeth line and Great Western services. | Elevated into the initial London terminus while Euston is completed. | Expected to serve as the London terminus for the opening stage. UNDER CONSTRUCTION |
| Birmingham Interchange | New station serving Birmingham Airport, the NEC and surrounding development. | Remains within Phase One. | Under construction. SURVIVES |
| Birmingham Curzon Street | New central-Birmingham terminus. | Remains within Phase One. | Under construction and included in the initial operating section. SURVIVES |
| Crewe | Major northern hub reached by the dedicated Phase 2a line. | Phase 2a was cancelled in October 2023. | No dedicated HS2 line. Future capacity depends upon conventional infrastructure and a possible replacement railway. HS2 DELETED |
| Stoke-on-Trent | Existing station intended to receive HS2-compatible services. | No purpose-built HS2 station was planned; the service case depended upon the complete network. | Final service depends upon the operating plan and capacity on the existing railway. UNCERTAIN |
| Manchester Airport | New HS2 station supporting airport access and development. | Removed with the western leg. | No HS2 station. DELETED |
| Manchester Piccadilly | Dedicated HS2 platforms and Manchester terminus. | Greater Manchester disputed the surface-terminal design before the entire HS2 route was cancelled. | HS2 infrastructure deleted; future arrangements depend upon Northern Powerhouse Rail and later decisions. HS2 DELETED |
| East Midlands Hub, Toton | New HS2 station between Nottingham and Derby. | Removed when the eastern leg was curtailed in 2021. | Original HS2 station deleted. DELETED |
| Sheffield Meadowhall | Original proposal for a new South Yorkshire HS2 station. | Abandoned in favour of serving Sheffield city centre using a mixture of new and existing infrastructure. | Original station did not proceed. DELETED |
| Sheffield Midland | Later plan for HS2-compatible trains to serve the existing city-centre station. | Dedicated eastern infrastructure was subsequently curtailed. | No dedicated HS2 line; future improvements depend upon separate rail programmes. REWORKED |
| Leeds | New HS2 terminus integrated with the existing station and surrounding regeneration. | Dedicated route and station removed in 2021. | HS2 station deleted. Most eastern-leg safeguarding has since been lifted. DELETED |
| Liverpool | HS2-compatible services using a combination of high-speed and existing infrastructure. | Liverpool never had a complete dedicated HS2 line. Cancellation removed the planned route towards the North West. | Future improvement depends upon Northern Powerhouse Rail and final service decisions. DEPENDENT |
| York and Newcastle | HS2-compatible trains intended to continue over the existing railway beyond the new eastern line. | Removal of the dedicated eastern infrastructure reduced the original journey-time and capacity proposition. | No HS2 track; benefits depend upon conventional-network improvements. REDUCED |
THE FINAL AUDIT
What Will Britain Actually Receive?
There is a real railway under construction, and pretending otherwise would weaken the argument.
Britain is building approximately 140 miles of new high-speed infrastructure between London and the West Midlands.
It includes major tunnels, viaducts, bridges, cuttings, earthworks, depots, railway systems and four principal station projects.
What Britain will receive
- Approximately 140 miles of new high-speed infrastructure between London and the West Midlands.
- An initial service between Old Oak Common and Birmingham Curzon Street.
- An eventual connection to London Euston.
- Birmingham Curzon Street station.
- Birmingham Interchange near the airport and NEC.
- Old Oak Common as a major interchange and initial London terminus.
- A connection at Handsacre allowing compatible trains to join the West Coast Main Line.
- Faster journeys between London and Birmingham.
- Some released capacity where long-distance services transfer from existing tracks.
- New trains capable of operating on both HS2 and parts of the conventional railway.
- Tunnels, viaducts, bridges, depots and associated infrastructure constructed across the route.
What Britain will not receive
- The complete Y-shaped national high-speed network.
- Phase 2a and dedicated HS2 infrastructure to Crewe.
- Dedicated HS2 track to Manchester.
- Dedicated HS2 track to Leeds.
- Manchester Airport HS2 station.
- Manchester Piccadilly’s dedicated HS2 infrastructure.
- The proposed Leeds HS2 terminus.
- The original East Midlands hub at Toton.
- The original eastern-leg capacity release.
- The original national service pattern and frequency.
- The original opening timetable or value-for-money proposition.
The surviving railway should not be dismissed as though it were nothing. Old Oak Common will be a substantial interchange. Birmingham will receive two new stations. London–Birmingham journeys will become faster. Some capacity will be released on the southern West Coast Main Line.
These are genuine benefits.
But they are not the complete benefits used to secure political and public support for the original project.
The remaining railway cannot continue borrowing the economic, capacity and connectivity claims of infrastructure that will not exist.
Britain is constructing a real railway. It is simply not the railway used to justify the cost, disruption and political promises.
THE BOTTLENECK
The Capacity Problem Was Not Cancelled
The most misleading description of HS2 was always that it existed merely to cut a few minutes from journeys between London and Birmingham or Manchester.
Its central argument was capacity.
The West Coast Main Line carries fast intercity trains, stopping services, regional trains and freight. Trains travelling at different speeds occupy capacity inefficiently because faster services catch slower services and require larger gaps between them.
Moving long-distance services onto a separate railway was supposed to release paths on the existing line.
But the surviving HS2 infrastructure ends at Handsacre, north of Lichfield. Compatible trains continuing towards the North West and Scotland must rejoin the West Coast Main Line.
North of Handsacre, HS2 trains will compete for paths on the railway HS2 was supposed to relieve.
The remaining line can create capacity between London and the West Midlands. It cannot deliver the full national capacity release that depended upon dedicated infrastructure continuing towards Crewe, Manchester and the eastern side of the country.
This is why cancellation saved less than the political presentation suggested. The expensive southern works remained, while the capacity value of the entire system was reduced.
THE WARNINGS
The Warnings Were There
HS2’s cost escalation is often described as though the scale of the problem could not have been anticipated.
But Britain was warned.
Michael Byng repeatedly challenged the official costing methodology used for HS2. His professional background was in the commercial management and measurement of major railway infrastructure, and he helped develop the Rail Method of Measurement used within the industry.
Byng’s estimates were considerably higher than the figures being presented publicly by government and HS2 Ltd.
His work was disputed. That is not unusual: major infrastructure estimates depend upon assumptions about design maturity, quantities, risk, inflation, land, stations, tunnelling and contingency.
But the proper response to a serious competing estimate should have been transparent reconciliation.
Government could have shown precisely why the estimates differed, which quantities were included, how risk was priced, what work remained immature and which assumptions were considered credible.
Instead, the lower official figures dominated the political story.
The 2019 Oakervee Review recommended proceeding with HS2, but Lord Berkeley—its deputy chair—produced a dissenting report. He argued that the cost and benefit case remained too optimistic.
Evidence from Byng, Berkeley, KPMG and other professional assessments did not produce one universally agreed alternative figure. It did, however, demonstrate that the official presentation was not the only credible assessment available.
By 2025 and 2026, the government was acknowledging that construction had begun with immature designs, contractual control was inadequate and necessary work had been misunderstood, underestimated or omitted.
In May 2026, the government attributed approximately two-thirds of the increase to underestimated work, inefficient delivery and matters within the control of HS2 Ltd, suppliers and previous governments.
Only approximately one-third was attributed to inflation.
Source: Oakervee Review and related independent assessmentBritain had access to warnings that HS2 was being dramatically undercosted—and proceeded as though optimism were evidence.
THE COMPARISON
Japan Built a System
Japan opened the Tokaido Shinkansen between Tokyo and Osaka in 1964.
More than sixty years later, it remains part of an extensive national high-speed network supported by decades of operational, engineering and institutional experience.
Japan is now constructing the Chuo Shinkansen, a superconducting magnetic-levitation railway designed for operation at approximately 500 kilometres per hour.
The maglev project has experienced delays, political disputes, environmental objections and rising costs.
Japan is not a magical country where major infrastructure appears without difficulty.
The difference is continuity.
A railway opens
The first Shinkansen begins operation. Japan continues expanding, operating and improving a national high-speed system.
A promise keeps changing
Britain announces HS2, begins construction, cancels most of the network and resets the surviving section before a passenger has travelled on it.
Japan built a high-speed railway, operated it, maintained it, expanded it and retained institutional knowledge.
Britain announced HS2 in 2010. Sixteen years later, it had cancelled most of the national network and was still revising the cost, specification and opening date of the first phase.
THE RESCUE NARRATIVE
When the Railway Failed, the Land Became the Product
Listen to the political conversation around HS2, Euston and northern railways now and the same phrases repeatedly appear.
Bicester Village has been offered as an example of how transport infrastructure can attract private capital and create commercial value.
But Bicester Village is a profitable luxury-shopping destination. A railway station delivers affluent customers directly to a commercial operation.
More passengers can mean more shoppers, higher sales, increased rents and more valuable property.
That is a visible and potentially capturable commercial return.
HS2 was supposed to be national infrastructure.
Its benefits included capacity, network resilience, freight paths, regional connectivity and economic development over several decades. Many of those benefits cannot be captured through retail receipts or the rent on apartments constructed beside a station.
That is one of the reasons states build infrastructure.
The present HS2 estimate includes an indicative cost for taking the railway into Euston. The government intends to secure some of that money through private finance and other mechanisms, including tax-increment financing and development across the wider Euston area.
That does not mean Euston is now imaginary. Work on the tunnels between Old Oak Common and Euston has begun, and the government has recommitted to a six-platform HS2 station.
But the financing language still requires scrutiny.
If public infrastructure causes surrounding land values to increase, who captures the uplift?
Does it return to the public body that created the value? Does it finance the station, affordable housing and local services? Or does it become a windfall for existing landowners and developers?
“Land-value capture” sounds technical and neutral. The distribution of that value is political.
PUBLIC NEED
What the country requires
- Network capacity
- Regional connectivity
- Freight paths
- Resilience
- Long-term development
PRIVATE RETURN
What can be monetised
- Property development
- Commercial rent
- Passenger revenue
- Retail expenditure
- Land appreciation
The danger begins when the question changes from “What railway does the country need?” to “Which parts of the railway can produce an investable return?”
THE CONTRADICTION
Britain Is Selling the Opportunity to Build Britain
Countries across the world combine public and private finance. There is nothing inherently wrong with private capital participating in infrastructure.
The question is who establishes the national plan, who owns the underlying assets, who receives the return and who ultimately carries the risk.
Singapore is regularly invoked in conversations about infrastructure, development and land-value capture.
But Singapore combines investment with powerful state institutions, extensive public land ownership and long-term planning. It does not simply wait to discover which national infrastructure private investors find most profitable.
Australia and other countries use public-private models within their own legal, political, regulatory and land-ownership systems.
Britain cannot import the attractive financing mechanism while rejecting the state capacity that makes the mechanism work.
The post-Brexit contradiction is difficult to ignore.
Britain was told that leaving the European Union would restore sovereignty, independence and national control.
Yet the language surrounding major infrastructure increasingly resembles a sales pitch to private and overseas capital.
How do we make Britain attractive?
What guarantees must government provide?
What land and development rights can be included?
How do we crowd investors into the project?
Every country seeks investment. That is not the objection.
The objection is that Britain increasingly appears dependent upon persuading private capital to finance infrastructure that the state has failed to specify, fund and deliver competently itself.
We supposedly took back control. Now we are packaging the country for investors.
THE AFTERLIFE
After HS2 Comes HS2 Lite
The northern section of HS2 was not cancelled because the railway was no longer needed.
It was cancelled because the British state had lost control of the project and its cost.
We know the underlying need did not disappear because political and business leaders almost immediately began developing another railway to fill the gap.
Andy Burnham and former West Midlands mayor Andy Street commissioned work on an alternative following the cancellation of the Birmingham–Manchester leg.
The proposal became the Midlands–North West Rail Link—inevitably described as HS2 Lite.
The mayors’ proposal examined a new railway running for approximately 80 kilometres from the surviving HS2 infrastructure around Handsacre or Lichfield towards Crewe and High Legh in Cheshire.
At High Legh, it could connect with the proposed Northern Powerhouse Rail route towards Manchester.
It would broadly recreate the missing connection between Phase One and the North West, but potentially at a lower specification.
Proposals have included operation at approximately 300 kilometres per hour, staged delivery, lower-cost construction, reuse of land and design work previously associated with HS2 and participation from private investors.
The options work was developed by an Arup-led consortium chaired by former HS2 chairman Sir David Higgins.
It may be a technically sensible railway.
A 300-kilometre-per-hour railway may be entirely adequate. Indeed, the maximum operating speed of the surviving Phase One railway has itself now been reduced to 320 kilometres per hour.
Designing the original HS2 around exceptionally high speeds imposed demanding geometry, engineering and certification requirements. A more proportionate specification deserves serious examination.
But that does not rescue the political story.
If this was the sensible railway, why was it not designed before Britain spent tens of billions beginning HS2 and billions more planning and cancelling its northern sections?
Government decides that a new Birmingham–Crewe–Manchester line is essential.
Britain develops the route, prepares legislation and purchases land.
The railway is cancelled because the project has become politically unaffordable.
The West Coast Main Line remains constrained and the capacity problem returns immediately.
Mayors commission a proposal for a cheaper railway through much of the same corridor.
Government accepts that another Birmingham–Manchester railway will eventually be required.
| Original HS2 northern route | Midlands–North West Rail Link |
|---|---|
| Birmingham–Crewe–Manchester | Handsacre/Lichfield–Crewe–High Legh |
| Part of one national HS2 network | Would require integration with separate NPR plans |
| Designed around operation up to 360 km/h | Lower specification around 300 km/h proposed |
| Primarily a government-funded national programme | Public funding and private investment proposed |
| Route, legislation and land work advanced | Business case, financing and delivery remain unsettled |
| Manchester Airport and Piccadilly included | Manchester access depends upon NPR arrangements |
| Cancelled because of cost | Promoted as a lower-cost alternative |
| Had an official opening programme | No secure construction or opening date |
THE LATEST PROMISE
Not HS2—Just Another Birmingham–Manchester Railway
The story moved again in May 2026.
The government announced its long-term intention to deliver a “full new rail line” between Birmingham and Manchester.
It explicitly stated that this would not be a revival of HS2.
No final specification or delivery timetable has been agreed. Further work will determine what is built and when.
The government expects the line to follow the completion of HS2 and Northern Powerhouse Rail. That could place delivery far beyond the current HS2 opening window and into an uncertain future programme.
In the meantime, land already purchased between the West Midlands and Crewe will be retained.
That distinction may matter inside government. It matters considerably less to the public that paid to develop the original corridor.
Britain planned a railway between Birmingham and Manchester. Britain cancelled it. Britain is now planning another railway between Birmingham and Manchester.
Calling the replacement something else does not erase the cost of getting back to the same conclusion.
Source: Government position on a future Birmingham–Manchester lineTHE TEST
The Same Promise, One More Time
Supporters of the replacement say Britain can learn from HS2 and deliver the best railway possible within the available budget.
But what is the budget?
What route is included?
Which stations will be served?
How much capacity will it create?
Who will fund it?
What will investors receive?
Who carries construction risk?
How will it connect with NPR?
When will it actually open?
“The best railway within the available budget” is not a specification.
It is another sentence designed to sound reassuring before the difficult decisions have been made.
We heard it when Phase One was supposed to open in 2026.
We heard it when HS2 “remained within budget.”
We heard it when the complete Y-shaped network was essential.
We heard it before Leeds was removed.
We heard it before Crewe and Manchester were removed.
We are now being asked to hear it again.THE SYSTEM
What Exactly Has Britain Learned?
HS2 is often described as a warning from which government must learn lessons.
That phrase has become almost meaningless.
The lesson is not merely that government needs firmer contracts, stronger management and mature designs before construction begins. All of that is true.
The deeper lesson is that Britain has lost the ability to maintain a national infrastructure strategy across political cycles.
A government promises a transformational national network.
The next political crisis produces another assessment.
Ministers promise that the project is finally under control.
One section is removed while the expensive work continues.
The wider network is abandoned after billions have been spent.
The missing infrastructure returns as a new proposal.
Local authorities are expected to keep planning throughout. Businesses are expected to invest. Communities are expected to live with demolition, construction and blight.
The public is expected to absorb every revised bill.
Then, when the original project becomes politically impossible, the missing infrastructure is repackaged under another name.
This is not simply incompetence inside HS2 Ltd.
It is the British model.
THE FINAL VERDICT
More Money, Less Railway
There will be something to show for HS2.
There will be stations, trains, tunnels, viaducts and a functioning high-speed line between London and Birmingham. People will work on it. People will travel on it. Some journeys will be faster. Some capacity will be released.
But physical construction alone does not prove that the project succeeded.
Britain is entitled to compare the final railway with the railway used to justify its cost and disruption.
We were promised a national high-speed network connecting London, Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds.
We are receiving a drastically reduced railway between London and the West Midlands, initially terminating at Old Oak Common, with an upper provisional cash estimate of £112.4 billion.
The northern capacity problem remains.
The West Coast Main Line remains constrained.
Crewe still requires investment.
Manchester still needs a better connection.
The North still needs Northern Powerhouse Rail.
Britain is now considering a lower-specification replacement for part of the railway it spent years planning before cancelling.
The government has formally accepted the long-term need for a new Birmingham–Manchester railway while insisting that it will not be a revival of HS2.
I drive past the bridges, tunnels and construction compounds. I can see what Britain is building.
What nobody can convincingly explain is what railway Britain will ultimately possess when every bill has been paid.
Britain did not merely fail to deliver HS2 on time or on budget.
It deleted most of the railway, retained an extraordinary proportion of the bill and then asked the country to treat the remaining construction as though the original promise had survived.
Now, having cancelled the route north, Britain is preparing to discover that it needs to build it again.